


The Core Curriculum in Professional Psychology



NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF
SCHOOLS OF
PROFESSIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY

Edited by:
Roger L. Peterson
James D. McHolland
Russell J. Bent
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Published by the American Psychological Association

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
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***THE CORE CURRICULUM
IN PROFESSIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY***



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PREFACE

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It is now a little over 3 years since the 1988 summer meeting of the National Council of Schools of Professional Psychology (NCSPP), which preceded the American Psychological Association's annual meeting. In hotel meeting rooms and air-conditioned restaurants in Atlanta, I first discussed the work that led to the San Antonio conference on the Core Curriculum in Professional Psychology and ultimately to this book. Though by no means clear then, I am impressed now that this vision of the core curriculum is fundamentally and profoundly "social." This seems evident in at least 5 ways:

First, social, social constructionist (cf. Gergen, 1982, 1985), and historical analyses of the core curriculum in professional psychology (Peterson, chaps. 1 & 3; Weiss, chap. 2) provide the intellectual ground and context.

Second, the centerpiece of the book is the most definitive articulation of the professional psychology competency areas to date. They are derived from and organized around an analysis of the social circumstances, the needs, and the demands of psychological practice, not the traditional areas of university psychological science (chaps. 10–16). It is obsolete to view professional psychologists narrowly as simply applying the findings of their experimental colleagues from mainline universities. Indeed Trierweiler and Stricker's notion (chap. 14) of the "local clinical scientist" suggests that practitioners have a social role to play as scientists (not only caregivers) within their local communities.

Third, this book advocates for a broadened, socially responsible, and responsive conceptualization of the core that includes explicit attention to women (Edwall, chap. 17; Edwall & Newton, chap. 19) and to ethnic diversity (Davis-Russell, Forbes, Bascuas, & Duran, chap. 20). Furthermore, the proposals about inclusion in the core of material relevant to the self of the professional psychologist and to experience is tantamount to arguing for the importance of person-focused social and interpersonal sorts of educational experiences (Singer, Peterson, & Magidson, chap. 28).

Fourth, using perspectives derived from social psychology, there is explicit attention to the educational contexts in which the core curriculum is embedded. Schools of professional psychology (Morrison, O'Connor, & Williams, chap. 6) and individual faculty (Borden & Mitchell, chap. 7) are polled for their opinions. Teaching is examined with an emphasis on the importance of modeling (Lubin & Stricker, chap. 5). The process and problems surrounding curricular change are examined from a social-organizational perspective (Cannon & McHolland, chap. 9).

Fifth, the social, interpersonal, and organizational processes that produced this

conference and this book were of sufficient importance to deserve the narrative attention I gave to them in chapter 1, rather than being segregated solely into a grateful preface. In my view, this is equally true for other similar conferences, even though the current convention is to artificially separate the knowledge products from the knowers. On a more personal basis, knowing the interests, attitudes, and styles of the editors of this book, the social emphasis cannot be surprising. Moreover, the NCSPP presidency of James McHolland, during which this work took place, had a strong and effective theme of inclusion and respect for diversity. No doubt the temporal context of this NCSPP conference—between one focused on diversity in 1989 and one on women in professional psychology in 1991—influenced its content. More generally, though, all three conferences were responding to larger necessary and fundamental social changes in professional psychology.

During a comment period following a presentation based on this material at the 1991 American Psychological Association annual meeting in San Francisco, a colleague of mine remarked that these ideas are "radical" (L. Mangione, personal communication, August 19, 1991). There seemed to be agreement all around. At the same time, in the age that has produced behaviorism, it is hard to see as particularly remarkable the suggestions that reinforcement conditions in university and health care settings have shaped psychology or that the demands of practice ought to influence training. Readers may find that the ideas in this book seem both radical and commonplace at the same time.

In my view, the NCSPP has come of age. It follows then that the social process of dissemination is increasingly a focus. Our hope would be to stimulate broad-based conversations about the ideas in this book—both radical and commonplace, both obvious and subtle, both practical and conceptual—within and beyond the boundaries of schools who identify with the professional psychology movement, among mainstream Boulder model clinical faculty, at institutions with master's degree programs, at undergraduate colleges, at internship and practicum training agencies, and among all who care about the shape of education in professional psychology in years to come.

PART I
CORE CURRICULUM:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1

THE SOCIAL, RELATIONAL, AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF THE CORE CURRICULUM AND THE SAN ANTONIO CONFERENCE

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The pronouncements of training conferences are not born, fully grown, from the forehead of Zeus, but rather come from a particular group of people, with particular relationships and allegiances, meeting in a particular social and historical context (cf. Weiss, chap. 2). In my view, the minimization or sometimes even blindness to the importance of context has led psychology into many discouraging corners. Therefore, I begin with sketches of the social, relational, and intellectual context of the National Council of Schools of Professional Psychology (NCSPP), its conference on the core curriculum in professional psychology, the core curriculum in general, and, in this process, this volume itself. This book emerged during a period of 3 years from the work of a group of people associated with NCSPP who, during a time of intense activity halfway through the process, came together for 3 days. They met in a fine hotel, recycled from its days as a college, stuccoed, with balconies along the river walk in San Antonio, Texas, in January 1990.

The National Council of Schools of Professional Psychology

Founded in 1974, NCSPP is an organization of professional programs in psychology whose mission is enhancement and enrichment of professional psychology training as well as mutual support. It currently consists of 27 member and 10 associate-member schools, 25 of which are accredited by the American Psychological Association (APA). For the last several years, after identifying a number of critical issues in professional psy-

chology, NCSPP has designated committees to study and organize relevant information, bring together a series of working papers, and design a midwinter conference for the larger membership.

This volume is the fourth in a series that has emerged from this process and the resulting annual training conference. The first of these volumes was *Quality in Professional Psychology Training: A National Conference and Self-Study* (Callan, Peterson, & Stricker, 1986). Arising from what has come to be known as the Mission Bay conference, the second volume was *Standards and Evaluation in the Education and Training of Professional Psychologists: Knowledge, Attitudes, and Skills* (Bourg et al., 1987). A third volume, *Toward Ethnic Diversification in Psychology Education and Training* (Stricker et al., 1990), based on the 1989 Puerto Rico conference, was published in 1990. NCSPP has scheduled a 1991 conference on women in professional psychology and a 1992 conference on evaluation in professional psychology training.

San Antonio Conference Participants and Structure

The participants at the San Antonio conference were representatives of the member institutions of NCSPP and their invited guests, as listed at the end of this volume. NCSPP began as an organization with one representative from each institution, usually a dean or another with a similar role. Before the 1989 Puerto Rico conference on ethnic diversification, typically one or two top administrators, the great majority being men, represented each program. After that conference and following some political developments (the details of which are unclear), a third institutional delegate could come who brought ethnic or gender diversity to the group. Authors of papers were invited to San Antonio, as were special guests from seven other organizations that are concerned with psychological training. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to some other training conferences, many of the conferees knew one another quite well and had working relationships going back a number of years. At the same time, there were people new as institutional representatives and therefore new to the organization and the group. Of the 78 participants, 72% (56) were men, 28% (22) were women, and 18% (14) brought ethnic diversity to the conference.

In a process that began 17 months earlier in Atlanta, contributors of papers were selected by an informal process that depended on the NCSPP representatives and their networks. A preconference volume was sent to each registrant in early December 1989. It contained draft versions of most of the material in this book. Given rigidly restricted and sometimes controversial page limitations, the authors were later asked to revise their work assuming a postconference perspective, which included knowledge of the conference resolutions.

The conference itself was composed of six sessions and a banquet. The first three of these sessions began with a plenary session and a framing address. Then, prearranged, intentionally diverse work groups, composed of 10 participants and led by steering committee members, met to discuss the issues and to develop resolutions. The steering committee met between sessions to compile, collate, and edit the notes of each group into a single product. Resolutions were reworked and approved during another series of plenary sessions. All the plenary sessions were held in a spacious ballroom with draped tables organized in a large rectangle; the podium and the steering committee were at one end, and the coffee was behind the seats at the other. This light and airy room was conducive both to comfort and to lofty ideas.

For the most part, participants arrived the day before the opening conference plenary session, attended NCSPP committee meetings and a reconnecting cocktail party, and then sampled San Antonio's cuisine. Reshaped to provide a sense of immediacy, to convey the intellectual context of the meeting, and at the same time to introduce this book, the next sections intentionally preserve some of the text and tone of my initial address and identify the central themes.

Opening Plenary Session: Social and Relational Context

So here we are this morning, reasonably awake, remembering each other's names and faces, wondering what this will actually be like. You know, I have found that carrying a book of preconference papers in my briefcase for 8 working days is equivalent to reading the papers: The knowledge goes up my arm and directly into long-term memory. Too late now, though, you will actually have to read.

Recently, I came across the following wonderful dictionary definition of *core*: "the central, innermost, or most essential part of anything" (Urdang & Flexner, 1969, p. 298). In a world where sometimes it seems as if no one is talking about anything important, we get to spend 3 days discussing the central, innermost, and most essential parts of the professional psychology curriculum. In addition, we are going to have a good time together. We have the opportunity to converse with respected colleagues—in the context of developing friendships—about matters that we have all considered deeply, complained about, and struggled with. We have a structure that allows small groups to get to know one another and to work to construct resolutions that will be considered by all of us in plenary sessions. If we use vision and creativity, our work will impact positively on training in professional psychology for years to come. We will eat well, relax, leave behind some aggravations from home, even pick up a few new ones here (maybe even in this chapter).

Some of my closest colleagues and friends from Antioch are here, with whom I share day-to-day enthusiasms and discouragements, who know my virtues and vices both, perhaps in more details than they or I would wish. There are others back home I carry in my head: more than 100 students who have entrusted to us their professional training, years of their lives, and many thousands of dollars; and 20 or so talented faculty who, oddly enough, do not always agree with me about everything. Here I have made some friends in this group with whom I have learned and laughed since 1983 when I first started coming. By the end of this meeting, there will be new developments in old relationships and some new relationships as yet unknown. Through this organization and particularly through the steering committee work for this conference, I have had the opportunity to work with talented psychologists. The most senior of these, Russell Bent and George Stricker, were finishing their doctorates while I was in high school. They are people whose work I respected long before I knew anyone who even knew them, let alone whether they were purported to have a sense of humor. Although none are here today, among NCSPP members are a professor who sat on my dissertation committee, a dean who was once my undergraduate student, and a person who in 1971 interviewed a thinner me for a job I did not get. (Do you think he remembers?)

My point is not to welcome you with a narcissistic tour through my personal scrapbook. Instead, I believe that my own array of relationships are not at all unusual, but rather are typical of the experience of each of you around the room. Here is the key: As with all other training conferences, the conversations we have, the positions we develop,

the scientific and professional work we do here this week will grow out of and be a product of our relationships, the social and interpersonal context of our lives, and this meeting.

I am, of course, aware that the relational and contextual positions that I am articulating have much in common with some feminist views of psychology. The further exploration of these enormously important personal, professional, and organizational issues will be our work for the 1991 NCSPP conference on women in professional psychology.

Let me digress for a moment to say that I have become fond of the term *conversation* to characterize what goes on between people in relationships: between friends (or enemies), colleagues, and psychologists and clients. The philosopher Richard Rorty (1979) suggested that the exploration of conversation is the "ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood" (p. 389). Conversation seems more balanced, more graceful, more respectful, less jargony, and a bit more universal than exchange, debate, or dialogue. I learned it from Bill Lax (personal communication, January 13, 1990), a constructivist and systemic psychologist who cited both Rorty (1979) and Goolishian (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988).

Certainly, it is true that the results of meetings of historians or lawyers discussing curriculum are just as influenced by relationships and social context. However, the circumstances of professional psychology are enormously different in three ways. First, relationships are central to almost every aspect of the work of professional psychologists. Second, as I argue in my chapter on the social construction of the core curriculum (chap. 3), the systematic neglect of social and interpersonal context in scientific psychology underlies many of the problems in both the science and the profession today. Third, in a profound sense, this conference is about relationships. Let me discuss each in turn and identify some of the major themes.

Core Curriculum: General Considerations

An understanding of the core curriculum is necessarily based on a series of general social, historical, scientific, and epistemological considerations. These global concerns are addressed in this introduction, in Weiss' thought-provoking historical analysis (chap. 2), in my own social constructionist perspective (chap. 3), and in a discussion of academic – scientific issues by Webbe, Farber, Edwall, and Edwards (chap. 4).

Centrality of Relationships in Professional Psychology

Perhaps the most unanimous belief of the people in this room is the foundational primacy of, in Kenneth Polite's and Edward Bourg's words, "the basic ability to establish, understand, and maintain an authentic and appropriate relationship" (chap. 11, p. 83) to all the functions of the professional psychologist. On the basis of the resounding level of agreement, let me say no more and turn to more controversial areas.

Social and Contextual Elements of Psychological Science

Relationships of all kinds are not in opposition to scientific psychology; rather, they

are its very foundation. Elsewhere, I have asserted that "any particular piece of psychological research or practice is embedded in a particular context: its historical time and its culture" (chap. 3, p. 24). Our science is fundamentally nonobjective, a product of the attitudes of psychologists and the relationships they have had with those whom they study. Along with Sarason (1981) and others, I see all too much of psychology—both experimental and professional—as fundamentally asocial and a product of those gifted, typically male, White, upper-middle-class professors who populate elite research institutions using disengaged and distant methods, where, for example, factors that could give a piece of research ecological validity come to be defined as error. I argue for a strengthened scientific psychology where "the development of psychological knowledge is changed from the universal to the contextual, from the distant and objective to the close and engaged, from ivory tower isolation to community embeddedness" (chap. 3, p. 25).

Reflexivity is a name for that process by which one can step out of the ongoing flux of living and, by a reflective glance, examine actions and behaviors in the past tense (Gergen, 1982, p. 18). Although it has long been a central element of our science and our practice (chap. 2 and chap. 18), I would like to see psychology formally differentiate itself from, say, astrophysics and geology and commit itself to identifying systematically the ramifications of this reflexivity inherent in the discipline.

I certainly do not want to give the impression that I want to eliminate university science or that I somehow think it is all bad or useless. I would like academic psychology to acknowledge forthrightly two essential points. First, as science fiction writer David Zindell (1988) said, "We don't see things as they are; we see things as we are" (p. 371). Second, every element of theory or data about human beings is understandable only in a social context, whether we are talking about the rise of behaviorism in the other-directed 1950s or Freud's insights about sexuality as a product of the intellectual ferment of turn-of-the-century Vienna that produced the visual artists Klimt and Schiele (Varnedoe, 1986).

Perhaps I can convey it metaphorically. Back in New Hampshire, I live on Spofford Lake, which I can see from my desk, located in a study high over the water surrounded by wood the color of piano keys. (Yes, I am afraid this *is* sort of a rustic, ivory tower metaphor.) In the winter the lake is frozen flat. When the sun is out, it gleams and glistens like silver, clean and orderly. Not many people are there in the winter. Oh yes, from time to time skaters, snowmobilers, or cross-country skiers come across it. I can see them now; the people are tiny dots of various sizes. The lake has a crisp, forbidding coldness about it. (This is why we northerners came to San Antonio, right?)

A universal conclusion about this scene such as "most people believe it is best to stay inside where it is most comfortable" is changed substantially by the contextual clause "in the New Hampshire winter." Nor would one wish to generalize from these observations that "arch-conservative New Hampshire citizens believe always in covering the entire body except for a small area on the face."

I count myself among those who continue to respect and admire even the most austere and wintry elements of psychological science: multiple regression, for example. I am attracted to the clarity and comfort provided by those large windows near my desk at this time of year. Still, sometimes it seems as if traditional academic psychology wants me to adopt a "scientific" perspective that seems to say I can know all of what I need to know sitting inside by myself, protected, warm, looking out on a January afternoon.

The summer, of course, is a different story. The lake is filled with life, families of all shapes and sizes, swimming, boating, having fun. People are actually in the water, with-

out their overcoats on. During the weekends, there is a buzz of excitement, an interesting complexity, although admittedly a certain human messiness.

I am not against winter, as long as it does not stay year-round and is not put forward as the critical nature of all reality. I want to include in professional psychology the view with friends and family, of men, women, and kids from different parts of the world down by that summer beach. Furthermore, I would like us all to actually be able to go in the water and even go out on boats. We may get wet, and there are bugs in the summer, but it is worth it.

Of course, professional psychology is not and cannot be antiscience. Our students must know that psychology is not something we or others just make up as we go along to fit the moment. We must, respectfully, test our thoughts, our observations, and our visions in the context of relationships with the human participants in research, according to systematic changeable rules derived during academic conversations. The conversation needs to focus on the nature of that science, its breadth, the sorts of science that are practiced by professional psychologists, and the sort of training that best prepares them. There must be a way to both do and appreciate this science on a summer day by the shore.

In this context, then, a theme of this conference is the development of a broad and inclusive vision of scientific psychology. Beyond the simple rote learning of quasiexperimental design and analysis of variance, a sense of tolerance should emerge from carefully cultivated, discipline-based training in critical thinking that eradicates attitudes characterized by "who knows?" or "anything goes." The scientific disciplinary core courses should be taught in such a way that the science and the profession are brought together. Generations of students have had the totally unnecessary experience in which material purporting to be foundational to clinical practice was taught in an alienating abstruse manner. If these courses are taught by academic faculty with only a minimal appreciation of the clinical enterprise or by clinical faculty with only a modest knowledge of the science, then these faculty will continue to model and create the very split that continues to plague our discipline.

As reflected in its label, the research and evaluation competency, of course, belongs in both the academic—scientific knowledge base (cf. Webbe, Farber, Edwall, & Edwards, chap. 4) and the professional core competencies. The integrative vision developed by Trierweiler and Stricker (chap. 14) brilliantly put psychological research in the context of real people in the relationships constituting professional psychology. Their commentary and vision of local science deserve careful scrutiny for both what they propose and the further thinking they stimulate. Science provides particularly important and illuminating kinds of conversations. In my view, these scientific conversations must include more diverse people who speak according to more flexible rules and must occur at the local level according to local needs. Furthermore, professional psychologists must converse about other things as well.

Pedagogy

All of us who have been taught, who teach, and who hire faculty know that pedagogy is critical to what students actually experience. I am talking about the sorts of teaching relationships that should be shared by faculty and students. It is embarrassing that a profession that says learning is a central focus has had so little involvement with quality education. I would like us to assert that quality teaching is the sine qua non of professional

education, long before research credentials and scholarly productivity. If close relationships with faculty are central, if being mentored is a core experience, if students are to be treated with respect, if modeling is pivotal as Lubin and Stricker (chap. 5) suggest, let us say so. If, as Rudestam suggests (chap. 8), national networks of personal computers are critical to the education of tomorrow, let us begin to put them in place today.

Empirical Work

Empirical studies of curricular issues are rare. Morrison and O'Connor (chap. 6) surveyed NCSPP programs with regard to program elements that make up the six competency areas. Seeing their centrality to professional education, Borden and Mitchell (chap. 7) surveyed the views of NCSPP faculty (rather than administrators) regarding the competency areas. Both studies found that the consultation and education and the management and supervision competencies are not well promulgated, and, in my view, they deserve expanded attention. These studies contribute to the literature about what is currently being done and about what faculty think, but, as Weiss (chap. 2) repeatedly and convincingly argues, no studies have shown whether particular curriculum elements explicitly lead to identifiable competencies in newly trained professional psychologists.

Curricular Change

Curricular change is not an easy process, as Cannon and McHolland (chap. 9) show us. This topic directs attention to the relationships between program leaders and faculty and students at home institutions. How many times have David Singer and I come back home from national training meetings all jazzed up with some clearly brilliant new possibility only to be treated as if we had had a strange acid trip or been kidnapped by religious fanatics? In faculty meetings, I have heard a conservative faculty member confidently propose a purported "innovation" that would take us into a time warp back to the 1950s. In spite of inherently conservative faculties, we must find ways to weave considerations of diversity, gender, and sexual orientation into the fabric of the curriculum. Working both ends, we can inspire our faculties to train the psychologists of the future while generating systematic contingencies for development and innovation.

Training Conferences and Relationships

Training conferences, including the San Antonio conference, are about relationships, not simply about our academic discipline. In the academic world, the term *discipline* is used "to refer to the knowledge and information base of a broad field of study and instruction" (Fowler, 1990, p. 2). In a broad sense, then, deeply embedded in the discipline, the core curriculum must prepare students for the professional relationships in which they will spend their lives. Even in a very narrow sense, curriculum can be seen as the content of the very special conversation that occurs in the relationships that compose doctoral training in professional psychology.

At the conference, our initial work focused on the attitudes and values underlying the core curriculum and gave rise to the general preamble in the resolutions (chap. 21).

All too often, comments on the core curriculum have focused narrowly on the content of courses. Afterward, indeed almost as an afterthought, have come statements about values and ethics. "Learn this stuff, be a scientist, take a practicum, oh yes, and be ethical and for diversity too," someone might have said. Admittedly, our own Mission Bay conference had a bit of this character as well. If certain attitudes and values are indeed the bedrock of the profession, they must be given an overarching priority in curricular conversations.

Our conversation about core attitudes and values is about the sorts of relationships we should have with our clients, our communities, and one another. It should speak to how we are to treat the others with whom we are in professional relationships: colleagues, students, and clients alike. We need, I believe, most of all an increased level of respectfulness. One of the most discouraging things about the academic rugged individualism Sarason (1981) described is that it makes some of our professional organizations and affairs—like some elements of the accreditation process, some purported actions of Council of Graduate Departments of Psychology (COGDOP) (in the not too distant past), and an unquotable critique of the American Psychological Association by a member of the American Psychological Society—seem as if they were written by the author of "How the West Was Won." Now I admit to enjoying a spirited debate as well as the next person. (Here I probably *should say* "next man.") However, I imagine these "competitions" might be more like friendly games of tennis than gladiatorial combat to the death. I further admit to having enjoyed, from time to time, a full and embarrassingly satisfying dinner at the table of professional disdain. (I was not there alone; there was a crowd.)

Singer, Magidson, and I (chap. 18) discuss related issues in the context of specifying the importance of the self-in-role and in relation to others as core. The development of a sense of self-in-relationship that guarantees a sense of collaborative collegiality is absolutely critical to professional psychology and is no easy business. I want to advocate for a professional psychology of engaged clinicians who bring their real selves to conversations with clients in authentic relationships. People who want to use their verbal skills to win can go to law school; there is room in medicine for those who wish to treat people's parts rather than their whole.

Professional Core Competency Areas

After the Mission Bay conference, I think we have a consensus on the areas of the professional core. There are six "competency areas that specify the generic core [that] require basic proficiency": relationship, assessment, intervention, research and evaluation, consultation and teaching, and management and supervision (including ethics) (Bourg, Bent, McHolland, & Stricker, 1989, p. 70). Training is to include relevant knowledge, skills, and attitudes. We should keep in mind that particular skills and attitudes within these competency areas define the sorts of relationships in which professional psychologists participate.

Along with the relevant resolutions, each of six chapters in Part II provides a particular conceptualization and basic background material for each competency area. Polite and Bourg on the relationship competency (chap. 11), Gold and De Piano on assessment (chap. 12), and Bent and Cox on intervention (chap. 13) are anchoring points for professional psychology, for the core curriculum, and for this book. Trierweiler and Stricker on research and evaluation (chap. 14) delineate their striking new vision of the

"local clinical scientist" for professional psychology. The consultation and education competency, according to Illback, Maher, and Kopplin (chap. 15), and the management and supervision competency, in the eyes of Bent, Schindler, and Dobbins (chap. 16) are underdeveloped in training programs. Curriculum in these areas must be expanded to better prepare tomorrow's psychologists, ironically, for what today's psychologists are actually doing in their own local contexts.

Broadening the Core Curriculum

On one level, a theme of the conference and of the book is broadening the core curriculum beyond traditional content "to include material relevant to the self of the professional psychologist, to experience, to women, and to ethnic diversity. . . . [We need] a broadened conceptualization of the core curriculum, beyond definitions by content, beyond traditional university science, and beyond the frame provided by the competencies" (Edwall, chap. 17, p. 129).

After Edwall's moving introduction, Singer, Magidson, and I (chap. 18) put forward that there should be "systematic attention to the nature of the relationship between the self of the student and the work of professional psychology" (p. 133). As mentioned earlier, we suggest that reflexivity, the ability to reflect on actions and behaviors in the past (Gergen, 1982, p. 18; Smedslund, 1985), must be in the center of training in professional psychology. Perhaps this is the area that is most obviously and directly about relationships. In a notion that is at the same time common and radical, it seems to me that the core curriculum should include the authentic self of each student in a way that necessitates particular, intense sorts of relationships to his or her colleagues and faculty. It is time for us to bring this sort of personal reflexivity into the core curriculum.

Edwall and Newton (chap. 19) make the case for a broadened psychological epistemology based on the contributions of feminist scholarship and examine the core structure of professional training curricula, experiences, and processes from the perspective of women. Then, Davis-Russell, Forbes, Bascuas, and Duran (chap. 20) discuss the necessity of understanding current psychological paradigms and of adopting a new one to effectively evaluate and generate knowledge pertaining to ethnic diversity. In asking where women and ethnic diversity fit into the core curriculum, we are asking how we are to relate across genders and to those we see as different from ourselves, those who are "the other." This process demands systematic curricular attention in ways only partly understood, particular knowledge, and a respectful willingness to explore the basis for conversations with others whose experiences may be quite different from our own. We need to commit ourselves to developing a nonalienating science to help us construct ways in which this can be done. We should be proud that NCSPP's midwinter conferences on diversity in 1989 and on women in 1991—as well as this one—should help to bring psychology along.

Conference Resolutions

The conference produced a remarkable and striking array of detailed resolutions beginning with the explicit identification of four curricular values: a broadened view of the educational domain of professional psychology, which includes humanities and personal and professional experience; the affirmation of multiple ways of knowing, both

objective and subjective; the demonstrated mastery of professional knowledge, skills, and attitudes; and the preparation for lifelong learning. The conferees also affirmed the value of "diversity and inclusiveness as fundamental elements of human experience" (chap. 21, p. 159); the necessity of education of the personal and professional self of the student; the importance of preparation for multiple professional roles; a broadly defined vision of curriculum; the centrality of relationships to the clinical enterprise; and "the [absolute] importance of the responsible use of power and authority" (chap. 21, p. 155).

Conclusion

As is clear by now, this book was the product of many other sorts of effort beyond the putting of words on a page and moving them around. I want to recognize by name the particular people who served on the steering committee, thereby creating the conference and this volume, although I will resist the temptation to characterize each of their particular contributions in a sentence or a phrase. They are (in alphabetical order) Russell Bent, Elizabeth Davis-Russell, Glenace Edwall, James McHolland, Ethel Magidson, Kenneth Polite, David Singer, and George Stricker. I am proud of these talented people, proud of the quality of conferees present, proud of having taken the high road, proud of our friendships, our respectfulness, and our caring, and proud of the work we have done together.

I want to close by returning to the question of relationships, particularly who we at NCSPP want to be to one another. I suppose, because we occupy similar roles, we have been mirrors for each other, often sharing with impassioned empathy. As the professional psychology movement has been and continues to be embattled, we have been a foxhole family. Struggling along this sometimes rugged road, I have believed that the Thomas Jeffersons and the Samuel Adams of the professional psychology movement are up there in front. Ground has been gained, but there still are redcoats just on the other side of the hill. I have worried at moments that Valley Forge was ahead of us, not behind us.

Sometimes the metaphor of revolution in professional psychology training seems apt. Regardless of rhetoric, that revolution is one that has more in common with religion than with science. Religious wars that have dominated the greater part of this first century of psychology are fomented by programs teaching their students the one and only true faith. I am for conversations with strong opinions, persuasively expressed, but such opinions should not be put forward as canon, to use Glenace Edwall's phrase (personal communication, August 8, 1989).

In our curricular conversations, we need to continue to keep two simple things in mind. First, as every student of learning knows, behavior responds to contingencies, and one learns best what one practices most. Contingencies designed to produce the best of practitioners are more likely to produce them than contingencies designed to produce university science researchers. Second, we have seen that there are people in need of us, less than they could be, imprisoned by their pasts, abused, frightened; people trapped by the intolerant and derogatory ideas of others; people run down by poverty and the economic system; and people ensnared by their own habits and thoughts. The ultimate task of our educational programs is to prepare professional psychologists who are willing to share their pain and to reach out a hand.

2

TOWARD A COMPETENCY-BASED CORE CURRICULUM IN PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: A CRITICAL HISTORY

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The history of the search for a core curriculum in clinical psychology has been influenced more by the profession's search for identity than by empirical findings. Although psychologists are fond of thinking of the debate on this issue as being influenced by philosophical, epistemological, and empirical factors, a fresh look at the reasons for promulgating a core curriculum may be needed if the profession is to break an impasse that has existed for the last 40 years.

Curriculum and training standards can be framed in at least three ways. *Content-based* standards identify particular content areas that must be in the curriculum, such as the familiar list that includes cognitive – affective, individual, social, and biological bases of behavior, history and systems, and so on. Programs demonstrate compliance essentially by means of syllabi. *Competency-based* standards indicate competencies that graduates are to have. At least in the ideal situation, program compliance would be demonstrated by providing evidence of student competence. Presumably, in a manner that encourages diversity and creativity, programs might develop a variety of ways of teaching particular competencies, always subject to empirical scrutiny. *Structural* standards identify particular organizational or educational structures that programs must have. Controversial examples include the proportion of full-time faculty, free-standing versus university-based programs, a concrete definition of residency requirements, and whether internships are full or part time and concurrent with or after course work. Content-based standards and structural standards typically are not based on data.

In this chapter, I argue that the profession has held stubbornly to the concept of a content-based core curriculum in spite of the fact that there is no evidence that it is re-

lated to the efficacy of practitioner training. To understand this persistence, I examine the different developmental stages of the profession as reflected in key conferences. Certain pivotal events occurred, each of which placed demands on the profession that it was not fully prepared to meet. At each point, activists within organized psychology seized these opportunities to move the profession forward at the cost of having to justify policies of standardization that had been established.

The major national conferences sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) have been critical in providing this justification. According to Bickman (1987), the profession has used these conferences as problem-solving mechanisms. Conferences that have been held during periods of consensus and that reflect such consensus in their conclusions have been viewed as successful. These conferences, along with accreditation practices, have been powerful instruments in psychology's efforts to shape and to promote the profession.

APA Conferences (1949–1987)

Boulder Conference (1949)

It is commonly agreed that World War II signaled the beginning of clinical psychology as a profession. After the war, the Veterans Administration (VA) asked organized psychology to identify appropriate graduate programs from which it could select interns to help staff its hospitals. Because preparatory work had to be completed quickly, APA formed a Committee on Training in Clinical Psychology, chaired by David Shakow, to formulate a recommended graduate course of study. The report (APA Committee on Training in Clinical Psychology, 1947) established a core curriculum and indicated that there must be study in general psychology, psychodynamics, diagnostic methods, research methods, psychotherapy, and related disciplines.

The Boulder conference was convened at least partially to justify decisions that already had been made. During the 2 years before the Boulder conference, the VA already had received its requested list of qualified programs, and 35 clinical psychology training programs had been accredited. In view of recent concern about the proliferation of clinical psychology training programs, it is ironic that 22% of the 155 clinical psychology programs that were accredited through 1988 (APA, 1988) had been granted accreditation in the 2 years before the 1949 Boulder conference. The Boulder conferees asserted that there should be a common core of training for clinical psychologists, but denied that there was "one best way" (Raimy, 1950, p. 55) to arrange subject matter, as the Shakow report attempted to do. They spoke strongly for this decision to be left to the universities.

The Boulder report warned that "overspecification can present a facade of logical integration that may well be contrary to the facts" (Raimy, 1950, p. 55) and called for the encouragement of diversity. It cautioned that this diversity might be blocked by accrediting agencies that "insist upon uniformity as a short-sighted means of achieving immediate goals" (p. 31).

The turf of clinical psychology, however, already had been established. By then, 35 programs, primarily from distinguished research and large state universities, had been accredited. Psychology, which had been identified primarily as a scientific discipline, had made a rapid transition into a profession as well.

As an aspect of establishing itself as a profession, clinical psychologists demarcated

a distinct vocabulary, necessary for what Larson (1977) called the "negotiation of cognitive exclusiveness" (p. 24). As Willensky (1964) explained, this has been a traditional step in turning an occupation into a profession. Unless its vocabulary can be made sufficiently unfamiliar to lay people, a group will have difficulty staking out its jurisdiction or claiming a monopoly on certain skills. This is particularly important for an occupation grounded in human-relations skills.

By the time the Boulder conference ended, the conferees had patched together the scientist-practitioner model and had taken another traditional step in the development of a profession. For a profession to develop, a group must be cohesive enough to be able to persuade others that the propagation of one paradigm of education is in everyone's best interests (Friedson, 1970). At the Boulder conference, this task obviously was made easier by the homogeneous composition of the participant group. Among the 53 university-affiliated psychologists, 51 represented programs that had been accredited before the conference convened (Raimy, 1950).

Clinical psychologists had agreed to define the profession in response to an external force (*viz.*, the VA request for a list of appropriate training programs). Not surprisingly, this expeditious definition included accommodation by the profession to psychology's long-standing battle for prestige as a research discipline within academe. With this definition in place, only 28 additional programs were accredited during the next 18 years (1950-1967).

Miami Conference (1958)

At the Miami conference, the participants approached the core curriculum very differently. They emphasized that (a) the profession would grow best by adding and deleting areas from the curriculum, (b) flexibility must be stressed, and (c) such experimentation was essential to the improvement of clinical training. They warned that accreditation must not be allowed to become a destructive force that pushed programs into conformance (Roe, Gustad, Moore, Ross, & Skodak, 1959).

There was an ironic pledge of allegiance to the profession's commitment to the notion of a core curriculum: Loyalty prevailed when the Miami conferees confirmed that there is a common core, but irony prevailed when they refused to specify what that core should be. The participants chose to leave that to each program to determine. The conferees, however, did endorse the need for some central oversight for clinical training and named APA accreditation as the mechanism for that oversight. Endorsement of the profession's enforcement arm was every bit as potent, if not more so, than intellectual validation of the core-curriculum concept would have been.

Chicago Conference (1965)

A second major event in the history of the profession was the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 because it created the demand for a considerably greater number of psychologists to staff the proposed community mental health centers. With the impact of this legislation as the background, the major theme of the Chicago conference became dissatisfaction with the state of clinical training. The participants warned of the futility of seeking only one solution regarding curricular requirements and en-

couraged the development of multiple models. It was clear that most programs were not meeting the need for adequate training.

The Chicago conferees adamantly refused to focus on the content of doctoral programs and *what* should be taught; instead, they examined *how* psychology should be taught. They adopted the resolution that the "notion of a core curriculum is no longer viable" (Hoch, Ross, & Winder, 1966, p. 88). The participants did not take a position on APA accreditation, but they commented that "organizational and institutional forces seemed to ward off diversity, because uniformity was easier to control and programs found it easier to pattern themselves after those already in existence" (Hoch et al., 1966, p. 75).

The Chicago conferees encouraged more diversity in training than the participants at previous conferences had done. Furthermore, they helped to open the door for psychology to play a greater part in the new mental health movement in the country. The pace of program accreditation increased after the Chicago conference. Beginning in 1968, and during the next 5 years, 30 programs became accredited. In 1972, 13 programs were accredited, the most in any one year since the group was formed.

Vail Conference (1973)

At the 1973 Vail conference, disenchantment with graduate psychology education was at its peak. By this time, there were many more employment opportunities for psychologists, and there were many more qualified applicants for graduate schools than there were slots in the research-oriented university programs. However, there were still only two accredited professional school programs and no accredited Doctor of Psychology (PsyD) programs.

Clearly, it was time for the status quo to be given a jolt, and the Vail conferees did just that. A more diverse group of participants than at previous conferences, the Vail conferees urged explicit recognition of an alternative doctoral degree, the PsyD, and the establishment of the practitioner model. The participants proposed more flexible curriculum building and advocated that students have a voice in planning their own individualized curriculum. They recommended creating an educational environment in which societal needs would be able to lead quickly to modification of curriculum (Korman, 1974).

Accreditation was described as "not equal to the task of adequately evaluating the efficacy of training, the quality of graduates, and the value of the services to the ultimate recipient" (Korman, 1974, p. 445). The Vail conferees recommended that the profession examine the functional relationship between content and the roles for which programs were preparing future professionals. They called for a demonstration project to revise the accreditation process by focusing on the competencies of graduates rather than the content they had learned. After the Vail conference, however, there was no demonstration project. Indeed, no such demonstration project ever occurred, although, as early as 1949, Shakow had urged APA to support validation studies of accreditation (APA Committee on Training in Clinical Psychology, 1949).

During the 14 years (1974–1987) after the Vail conference, 22 of the 53 clinical psychology programs that were accredited were explicitly professional programs with practitioner models. In 1979, APA, in response to the development of these programs, revised its accreditation standards to allow for (a) more flexible faculty staffing patterns, (b) multiple models of internship, (c) recognition of the PsyD, and (d) acceptance of

free-standing institutions outside the traditional university system (APA, 1979). Seventeen of the 22 practitioner programs that became accredited from 1974 to 1987 were PsyD programs, and 7 were in free-standing institutions.

These revised standards, however, did not free up curricular requirements. During the 1970s, two developments helped to determine that there would be greater rather than lesser specification of the curriculum in the new accreditation standards. First, during this decade there was optimism that psychology might be included as a primary health-care provider in national health insurance. Organizations such as the National Register insisted on more standardization of educational criteria to ensure this outcome. Second, in 1975, in a judicial decision that allowed a clearly nonqualified applicant to sit for the licensure examination in Washington, DC, Judge MacKinnon said psychology is an "amorphous, inexact, and even mysterious discipline [and] possession of a graduate degree in psychology does not signify the absorption of a corpus of knowledge as does a medical, engineering or law degree" (cited by Wellner, 1978, p. 6). Quoting this excerpt proved to be one of the most powerful arguments used by the prostandardization forces.

The threat that psychologists could be excluded from national health insurance by court challenges to the identity of the profession drew a strong response. Reacting to Judge MacKinnon's assessment of psychology, the profession, as it had done almost 30 years earlier, allowed an external force to dominate its decision as to how to define itself. Wellner (1978) called for a national consensus on the core curriculum for clinical psychology programs, and such a consensus, at least among the major regulatory bodies in psychology, seems to have been reached. APA, the American Association of State Psychology Boards, the National Register, and most state licensing boards specified similar core-curriculum requirements: scientific and professional ethics and standards; research design and methodology; statistics; psychological measurement; history and systems; individual, biological, cognitive – affective, and social bases of behavior; practica; and internships.

Salt Lake City Conference (1987)

The most recent major conference cited the recurrent issue of a core curriculum as the central issue needed for the unity of the profession (Bickman, 1987). Although the Salt Lake City conferees made the usual call for program independence for specification of the core content, at the same time they endorsed the basic areas specified by APA for programs seeking accreditation in professional psychology (National Conference on Graduate Education, 1987). Because APA accreditation is almost essential for a clinical psychology program to survive, this endorsement is tantamount to preserving the status quo.

Therefore, during the last 10 years, psychology training has been shaped by a liberal definition of organizational structure and type of degree offered but by a standardized definition of the core curriculum. The result is that many programs offer the PsyD and operate out of an explicit practitioner model, but their curricula are increasingly similar to more traditional programs (Kopplin, 1986).

National Council of Schools of Professional Psychology Conferences (1978–1987)

In addition to the conferences supported by APA, there have been several conferences sponsored by the National Council of Schools of Professional Psychology (NCSPP), an organization founded in 1977 to develop standards for education and training of professional psychologists. NCSPP has taken a different approach to issues such as core curriculum, perhaps because it has the singular mission of promoting the best training for professional psychologists, not the responsibility of defending the dual aspects of the scientist–practitioner model.

Virginia Beach Conference (1978)

In the first NCSPP conference at Virginia Beach in 1978, one key resolution was that the curricula of the practitioner and scientist–practitioner models need to be evaluated through outcome research, because there is no evidence regarding the effectiveness of curriculum models in producing competent practitioners (Watson, Caddy, Johnson, & Rimm, 1981).

La Jolla Conference (1981)

In 1981 at the La Jolla conference, NCSPP participants continued to call for a research-based approach to establishing quality assurance. In addition, they agreed to publish descriptive information about what actually goes on in professional psychology programs (Callan et al., 1986). In a preconference paper, Gianetti, Peterson, and Wilkins (1986) exposed the historical concept of the core curriculum, as reflected in accreditation criteria, as nothing more than the collective agreement of organized psychology. They noted that collective agreement could merely generate hypotheses about what curricula would result in desirable outcomes, but it did not confirm such hypotheses.

Gianetti et al. (1986) warned that strictly adhering to consensually defined practices would merely reduce the variation in the practice. The conferees resolved to continue research on these issues in an effort to move beyond description toward the ability to perform evaluative, criterion-based research. Unfortunately, if one views program curricula as an independent variable (Gustad, 1958), reduction of innovative curricula reduces the variance and makes such research much more difficult.

In two separate conference papers (Bent, 1986; Kopplin, 1986), the notion was introduced that core-curriculum development and evaluation must focus on a set of competencies rather than content areas. If a competency-based core curriculum were adopted, curricula could be evaluated in terms of their success at developing these competencies in students.

Mission Bay Conference (1987)

At NCSPP's Mission Bay conference in 1987 (Bourg et al., 1989), the participants resolved that there should be a core curriculum in professional psychology based on six

identifiable competency areas: relationship, assessment, intervention, research and evaluation, consultation and education, and management and supervision. The conferees concluded that understanding the relation between knowledge bases and professional applications is more important than knowledge from a content-based curriculum alone.

The need to evaluate curricula in terms of competence, asserted by NCSPP members at the Virginia Beach conference, the La Jolla conference, and the Mission Bay conference, is not new and can be traced back to the 1973 APA Vail conference. The Vail participants believed that a lack of concern for program evaluation was inconsistent with clinical psychology's stated pride in evaluation research and in being a data-based discipline (Korman, 1973). Similarly, Koocher (1979) was curious about the lack of attention that had been paid to establishing the validity of licensing requirements. He asserted that the cost of promulgating nonvalid measures was often ignored by organized psychology. Stern (1984) stated that the lack of empirically based methods for assessing competence in professional psychology prevented adequate evaluation of any training models and left little basis for stating that particular educational practices ensured professional competence.

Resistance to a Competency-Based Core Curriculum

There are a number of reasons for organized psychology's resistance to the task of tying the core curriculum to professional competencies. The most prevalent arguments are as follows:

1. This type of research is complex and expensive (Menne, 1981).
2. Competency-based education might lead to a lock-step curriculum and diminished academic freedom (Bent, 1986).
3. Focusing on phenotypic skills may be the wrong approach; genotypic abilities, such as that of inquiry, should be the focus of training in psychology. Stern (1984) believed that the goal should be genotypic competence that allows one to do many jobs well. Teaching should focus on intellectual processes and methods, such as active learning, criticizing and integrating a body of research literature, and being able to compare psychological theories, rather than emphasizing particular content. Stern (1984) indicated that this is what Flexner (1910) really wanted medical education to include. Starr (1982) agreed and reported that, contrary to common perceptions, Flexner (1925) would have preferred that medical education have the flexibility of arts and sciences graduate education and that Flexner (1925) became increasingly disenchanted with the rigid educational standards that became identified with his name. McHolland, Peterson, and Brown (1987) stated what seems to be a summary of NCSPP's position on this issue: Metacognitive skills, such as a student's ability to evaluate oneself in professional applications, are very important. "We maintain only that both phenotypic and genotypic skills need to be assessed and that appraisal of the former is likely to be easier than appraisal of the latter" (p. 117).
4. Psychology would become a collection of specific skills or occupations rather than a profession, and education or experience requirements would be irrelevant (Menne, 1981). This last criticism seems to provide the best explanation for organized psychology's resistance to competency-based education or, for that mat-

ter, to education geared to the training of the professional self and metacognitive skills. The profession has labored to establish a corpus of knowledge that defines clinical psychology, and it has relied on core-curriculum requirements to maintain its cognitive exclusiveness.

According to Stern (1984), psychology must begin to differentiate its economic -- political agenda from its educational agenda. The former defines psychology and educational practices in a way that protects and advances the economic interests of psychology, whereas the latter is concerned only with the best training for practitioners. Both agendas are important, but can result in contradictory definitions. Stern argued that a content-based core curriculum may best serve the economic -- political agenda, but only a competency-based core curriculum can advance the scientific investigation of what constitutes the best educational practices.

Rather than being drawn into a bona fide debate on the relative merits of these two models, organized psychology is actively considering the addition of new structural, non-data-based educational requirements to reassert its exclusiveness and control. In a preconference paper at Salt Lake City, Altman (1987) admonished that a reactionary orientation might be about to form, and this has historically taken the form of "excluding free-standing schools, reinstating lengthy core curriculum requirements, [and] insisting on traditional patterns of education" (p. 1068).

This warning should be heeded because such reactionary attitudes, indeed, are on the rise. In 1987, the APA Salt Lake City conferees called for the abolition of free-standing schools by 1995 (National Conference on Graduate Education, 1987). At a recent conference on internship training (Belar et al., 1989), the participants recommended that (a) the internship requirement be lengthened to 2 years, (b) all interns be selected from APA-accredited educational programs, and (c) all internship training take place in APA-accredited internships. Furthermore, in 1989, the members of the APA Task Force on the Scope and Criteria for Accreditation (American Psychological Association, 1989) made the following regressive recommendations: (a) a return to primary reliance on full-time faculty members; and (b) restriction of student internships to the period after completion of the educational program rather than in concurrence with some academic work.

It appears that the most savvy leaders of reactionary forces in organized psychology have come to understand what critical observers of the history of medical education already know: Psychology does not need its own Flexner (1910) report to reduce the number of educational programs and students in professional psychology. As Starr (1982) noted, in the 5-year period *before* the Flexner report was published (1906 -- 1910), 31 medical schools closed their doors. In the 5 years after the publication of the report (1911 -- 1915), only 36 more closed. It was not the Flexner report, as commonly believed, that closed the medical schools. Rather, it was the steadily rising requirements (e.g., lengthening the curriculum, adding internship requirements) imposed by licensing boards and other regulatory authorities that altered the economics of medical education and decreased the number of students and graduates.

Conclusion

A certain amount of nonsense is to be expected in the interpretations of what best serves the profession. However, some of these resolutions threaten to alter permanently

models of education and possibly to close successful programs without any evidence that these models or programs are any less successful than traditional programs in producing effective psychologists.

Gianetti et al. (1986) noted that "debates [about the core curriculum] are mainly rhetorical and emotional since they are based on beliefs and political considerations rather than on empirical evidence" (p. 165). An example of this sort of rhetoric is Eriksen's (1958) comment that psychology valued experimentation and academic freedom more than it did uniformity and standardization. He stated, "It will be a sad day when we agree on the content of the core curriculum" (p. 58). In another example, Fox and Barclay (1989) provided a genuine disincentive for psychologists to examine critically the issue of the core curriculum by asserting that "resistance to the definition of such a core for the education and training of clinical psychologists is based on shadow rather than substance" (p. 56). A final example of rhetoric is contained in my own transcription of Fox and Barclay's (1989) quote—the belief that a content-based definition of a core curriculum is based on shadow rather than substance: The shadow is cast by organized psychology's economic-political agenda.

I hope it is time for the profession of clinical psychology to go beyond such rhetoric. The participants at the NCSPP San Antonio conference, the midwinter 1989–1990 meeting, reaffirmed the notions that (a) the core competency areas should be the organizing principle for curriculum construction, and (b) a content-based core curriculum should not be an end in itself. The conferees also supported variety in curricular designs and called for attempts to validate the effect of different curricular designs on the development of professional competencies in students.

However, it will require more than the San Antonio resolutions to change clinical psychology's 40-year preoccupation with a content-based core curriculum or to prevent the establishment of new nonfunctional educational requirements. Since the 1949 Boulder conference, the participants at every major training conference have warned that accreditation practices can stifle needed experimentation with curriculum development, and this is exactly what has happened. Since 1949, participants at curriculum and training conferences have called for validation studies of educational practices. Whether professional psychology has reached a stage in its development when it will follow through on these studies is still to be determined.

3

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE CORE CURRICULUM IN PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Most traditional professional psychologists have grown up with the belief that there is an underlying core discipline in psychology with particular knowledge and methods, however unclear the elements of that discipline might be at a certain historical moment. In this view, there are human universals waiting to be discovered by closer attention to patterns of reinforcement or the decoding of unconscious meanings, although few imagine that the equivalent of a better telescope or a space probe would unveil that basic nature of the psychological solar system. Traditional psychologists believe in a deterministic world where there must be stable and predictable underlying patterns, even if these patterns are seldom apparent in our own lives or in our own times. Conveyed through a constantly developing core curriculum, advancements in the discipline that would solve psychological problems and provide a firm base for practice would emerge over time by adhering to objective, disinterested, value-free scientific methods that produce empirical data. Although each of us questioned some part or another of this viewpoint, these common beliefs were perhaps a naive version of logical positivist metatheory of the sort communicated by generations of introductory psychology textbooks.

Of course, we all understood that there were social pressures on this science: the politics of universities and academic departments, the growth of clinical psychology after World War II, the community mental health movement, research support, and so on. Even so, the core discipline was thought to be sound, protected by the timeless and improving methods and procedures of science, such as physics and astronomy. At worst, the social pressures would lead to waste or faddish research or perhaps would contribute experimental error. The current version of this position is expressed by Matarazzo's (1987) vision of the "one psychology" with "many applications" (p. 893), with its

articulated faith in a content-based core curriculum. In this perspective, the disciplinary science is in the foreground against a vague and not especially important social context.

In strong contrast, the application of social constructionist metatheory, a social epistemology (Gergen, 1982, 1985), reverses the figure and the ground. The accumulated knowledge of the human, social aspects of psychology are a product and creation of particular social contexts. In this chapter I examine the core curriculum in professional psychology—its historical background, as it exists today, and as it might develop—through the lens of social constructionism.

In the context of the core curriculum, I argue for vastly increasing the importance of an intellectually coherent, general social frame in the training of professional psychologists (cf. Leary & Maddux, 1987). After summarizing some relevant elements of social constructionist thought, I examine the social culture and history of professional psychology and the increasing importance of cross-cultural and ethnic psychology. Then I apply a similar analysis to the current training context and to the professional school movement. Next I discuss social reflexivity, along with its ramifications (Gergen, 1982; Smedlund, 1985), as particular characteristics of the discipline of psychology on the personal, personal – professional, professional, and cultural levels. Social interactional and social individual elements are mentioned only briefly because they are mostly beyond the scope of this chapter. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of social responsibility. Throughout the chapter, I refer to various cores (e.g., a core for the future, a social responsibility core). My point in using this language is to emphasize that the core can be thought of in ways other than as a course in this area and a course in another area.

Social Constructionist Epistemology

Gergen (1982), in his book *Toward Transformation in Social Knowledge* as well as in his more accessible 1985 article, applied the social constructionist position to the field of psychology. He showed convincingly how the social knowledge on which the science and ultimately the profession depend is embedded in a particular culture and history, influenced by the scientific “rules” that have been developed primarily in university contexts, formed by power relationships and economics, and based on value-laden foundations (Gergen, 1982). In contrast to the traditional view, this frame “removes knowledge from data-driven and/or cognitively necessitated domains and place[s] it in the hands of people in relationship” (Gergen, 1985, p. 272). It is a mistake to try to understand the core curriculum as a disembodied product of empirical science.

Gergen (1982) doubted whether there are any universal human truths or trans-historically valid principles to be discovered. Any particular piece of psychological research or practice is embedded in a particular context: its historical time and its culture. Specific influences on knowledge products include local, regional, national, ethnic, economic, and gender-based characteristics. Furthermore, the very language of psychological description is rooted in a specific culture (p. 30).

Much social and behavioral research is based on the questionable assumption of the underlying stability of human behavior. Although research moves forward based on a “limited set of systematically constrained experiences,” there is a “multitude of disordered and discontinuous events taking place outside the scientific sanctum” that more accurately reflect real human phenomena (Gergen, 1982, p. 2). If human behavior is much more responsive to situations and is less internally driven, the straightforward, traditional idea that a professional psychologist learns the basic scientific facts and then

applies them to clients becomes questionable. The information necessary to understand and to influence another is primarily available in the local social circumstances rather than in traditional psychological studies. Therefore, the acquisition of core professional skills and processes that will allow access to the necessary, locally relevant information may be more central to the profession than acquisition of supposedly general psychological knowledge.

Furthermore, according to Gergen (1982), this fundamentally nonobjective behavioral science theory affirms the ultimate value of empirical research but changes its context and interpretation. Some argued that ideological interests in the behavioral sciences are masked by laying claim to objectivity, which in fact rationalizes an enhanced position of authority or power and suggests that knowledge is best gained from distant relationships rather than from trusting, intimate, or collegial ones (Gergen, 1982, pp. 32–33).

Criteria for rigorous research demand personal distance between the observer and the observed. A deep and intimate acquaintance between the two would threaten the ostensible validity of the research findings. Yet the implicit message contained within methods designed by this criterion is that superior knowledge in the social sphere is gained through alienated relations. Intimate relations are implicitly blind and unrealistic. (Gergen, 1982, p. 33)

Although the concept of "alienated relations" (Gergen, 1982, p. 33) between scientist and subject may have little to do with the study of the atmosphere on Mars, it is critical to the study of the atmosphere of intimate relationships and race relations in cities. Far from being universal, the objective standpoint may have within it a strong, potentially self-serving and negative, almost antisocial bias. Research developing from this tradition cannot be the primary basis for an interpersonally connected professional psychology.

The *scientific* and *empirical* context of the development of psychological knowledge is changed from the universal to the contextual, from the distant and objective to the close and engaged, from ivory tower isolation to community embeddedness. It illuminates the present, puts the past in context, is much more pragmatic, and obliges asystematic consideration of the moral standards inherent in our science and profession. We must situate "ourselves within a much more diffuse and flowing realm of activity; simply, we must begin from within our actual everyday life situation . . . whatever *that* is" (Shotter, 1985, p. 168). Most striking, this perspective heals the long-standing schism between clinician and researcher with a cooperative vision of "local science" (see Trierweiler & Stricker, chap. 14). Gergen (1982, 1985) called this new, more human, and humane vision of the behavioral sciences "socio-rationalism." Systematic, rational scholarship and research explicitly embedded in particular social contexts help to provide significance and meaning for human communities.

Social constructionism and psychology itself have a context. Marginalized or victimized groups quite reasonably come to question the nature of the social knowledge put forward as science by the dominant political groups. Hawkesworth's (1989) superb article on epistemologies in feminist scholarship presented the alternative worldviews in a way that is relevant to the issues inherent in the social science of all disenfranchised groups. She identified four epistemologies, which I present in a general, rather than in her feminist, frame. The first of these parallels Gergen's (1982, 1985) descriptions of traditional positivistic, empirical psychology. The second is standpoint theory, which argues that there is a privileged perspective that emerges from people who are oppressed that "can pierce ideological obfuscations and attain correct and comprehensive understanding of the world" (Hawkesworth, 1989, p. 536). The third is postmodernism, a

deconstructionist position that "rejects the very possibility of a truth about reality" and argues for the "situatedness" of each observer (Hawkesworth, 1989, p. 536). This perspective involves "profound skepticism regarding universal (or universalizing) claims about the existence, nature, and powers of reason" (Hawkesworth, 1989, p. 536). The fourth perspective, for which Hawkesworth ultimately argued, is based on "cognition as a human practice" (Hawkesworth, 1989, p. 536). To a substantial degree it parallels social constructionism as presented here, although the language is different and rationalism is not central.

In the context of standpoint theory and postmodern views, the social constructionist perspective, with its confidence in rationality and contextual empiricism, seems downright conservative. All of psychology faces a challenge: The concerns of women, minorities, and third-world people (cf. Moghaddam, 1987) ultimately must be addressed within the context of our science if it is to remain viable over the long term. These issues, too, must be addressed in the core curriculum.

Social Culture and History

Scientific as well as professional knowledge are historically dependent on the prevailing meaning systems and conceptual structures of the times (cf. Gergen, 1982, p. 17). If psychology and its core curriculum have been created by people "in relationship" (cf. Gergen, 1985, p. 272) at a particular historical moment and in a particular subculture, all of these elements merit scrutiny.

Certainly, social contexts draw together compatible people who in turn further develop the contexts. A discussion of the sorts of people who have created American psychology can emphasize their social context or their personalities. The first position is that psychology has within it two cultures (Kimble, 1984) or two sorts of people (Dana, 1987) variously defined. One of these cultures is said to be inhabited generally by the sorts of faculty described later, which Sampson (1985) spoke of as dominated by "egocentric control," Shotter (1989) identified as governed by the text of "possessive individualism," and Dana (1987) labeled "alpha persons," the bad (mostly) guys or the real scientists depending on one's perspective. The other culture—Sampson's (1985) "sociocentric" and Dana's (1987) "beta persons"—is said to consist of the good guys, women, minorities, and creative-intuitive, humanistic types or soft-headed antiscientists.

There are moments where this sort of argument seems persuasive. However, I believe that a rigorous professional psychology demands a particular sort of contextual, engaged, related, and committed science, not the elimination of science and substitution of a similarly valuable but substantially different humanism embodied in different sorts of people. According to the social constructionist position, neglect of social context in psychological science has led to error and misunderstanding within the context of the traditional, "egocentric" culture by its own internal standards, not simply to immorality and alienation as viewed by the outsider "sociocentrics."

The second position is that people create knowledge products consistent with who they are, the culture in which they find themselves, and the people and questions they study. A historical examination of the profession within the context of the characteristics of university faculties and university life should illuminate the past and pave the way for future changes in training and ultimately in vision.

American University Culture and Psychology

Sarason (1981, 1982) suggested that traditional universities attract and select intellectual "rugged individualists," "assertive, ambitious prima donna types" who "go their own way and frequently clash" (Sarason, 1982, p. 222). These usually White male faculties were influenced by contingencies that rewarded short, contained studies with clear experimental controls and simple statistics, but not the local, fundamentally interpersonal activities of clinical work, excellence in teaching, or local science (see Trierweiler & Stricker, chap. 14). Faculties of influential universities teaching future practitioners felt—and often still feel—obliged primarily to ground themselves in research rather than in practice.

According to Sarason (1981), pre-war American psychology was "aclinical in orientation; at worst, it was anticlinical" (p. 831). Psychology had "no experience with what was involved in training clinical psychologists, with the creation of settings for clinical practice, and with the culture of existing settings devoted to clinical service" (p. 831). The field's strengths were its research traditions, sophistication, and skepticism consistent with its individual focus. Testing was a relatively "minor asset" (p. 831).

The economics of the development of clinical psychology has strongly influenced both its form and its bedfellows. According to Sarason (1981), after World War II, the partnership between Veterans Administration and medical centers guaranteed psychiatric and medical domination of the new profession of clinical psychology. "Basic" research dollars went into the medically dominated National Institute of Mental Health. Therefore, it seemed socially responsible to forge a tie with psychiatry, especially because the federal monies would support students and pay for expanded faculties and consultancies. With this arrangement came psychiatry's intrapsychic orientation and a quiet, not entirely uncomfortable seat for clinical psychology in the back of the bus (a bus without women and children). "Clinical psychology became part of a medically dominated mental health movement that was narrow in terms of the social order, and as imperialistic as it was vigorous" (Sarason, 1981, p. 833). This influence is felt even today with the typical licensure requirement that there be 2 years of supervised practice in an organized health-care setting. Arguably there continues to be an enormous difference in the way psychology is practiced in medically dominated settings compared with settings where psychology rules its own house.

The "Asocial" Professional Psychology

According to Sarason (1982), it was not surprising that psychology "focussed on the individual psyche, what Murray Levine calls the emphasis on 'intrapsychic supremacy'" (p. 222). The influence of the structure, organization, and traditions of the setting on daily life was thought to be minimal.

Even social psychology limited itself to the experimental study of interpersonal interactions and small groups (Leary & Maddux, 1987). As stated by Sarason (1981), "It was not social in the sense of placing these interactions in the context of a highly differentiated society with a distinctive culture and ideology that were reflected in and reinforced by governmental, political, educational, religious, and financial (profit-making) systems of institutions" (p. 832). Psychology itself has its own fundamental attribution error: vastly overestimating the power of internal forces and vastly underestimating the role of external forces in people's lives (cf. Sarason, 1982, p. 211).

Although there are certainly notable exceptions (Leary & Maddux, 1987), too little academic attention has been paid to social phenomena such that key theories in the discipline itself have developed in a way that makes them seem as an academic afterthought, peripheral, certainly not central to the science or to the realities of professional practice. There are, of course, exceptions. Sarason (1981) reported that John Dewey saw psychology in a manner consistent with this chapter and said so in his 1899 American Psychological Association (APA) presidential address. "Dewey saw clearly what psychology is blind to: The substance of psychology cannot be independent of the social order. It is not that it *should not* be independent but that it *cannot* be" (Sarason, 1981, p. 827). It is not surprising, then, that this dominant, largely individual psychology did not provide coherent theoretical conceptions to understand people in their (ecologically realistic) social contexts, let alone a central, coherent place for women's concerns or for the study of ethnic diversity. This asocial professional psychology (Sarason, 1981, p. 827) has underestimated the influence of social pathology (Albee, 1986), neglected issues of power and victimization, and minimized the importance of context—cultural and ethnic, organizational, professional, and situational—on the lives of people.

Cross-Cultural and Ethnic Psychology

In addition to the influence of the dominant individual psychologies, cross-cultural and ethnic influences on psychology have been minimized for other, more subtle reasons. The purported pursuit of universal truths, described earlier, often turned out to be an ethnocentric (and male-centered) arrogance, as if others must be generally similar to the mostly male, White, upper-middle-class professors and their student subjects. Dana (1987) asserted that "cross-cultural training has been neglected because culturally different persons are presumed to be similar to oneself and to desire the same ingredients for high-quality life-styles" (p. 12).

According to Shotter (1989, p. 135), it is the use in research of the third-person, passive voice that fails to capture the character of the important relationships between whom one studies and oneself. Therefore, this research misrepresents the others' social life as well as the ethical and political relations between what are referred to as subjects and those studying them. The lofty, scientific, third-person perch allows pronouncements to be made about the other that seem to have the truth of planetary orbits, while creating and sustaining social orders and directing attention away from certain important social and interpersonal phenomena.

It is doubtful that a valid cultural psychology can be derived unless the scientist and the people to be studied share a common language and culture, whether in a broad (e.g., Western culture) or narrow (e.g., local) sense (Smedslund, 1985). Obsolete are the historically ubiquitous culturally imperialistic attitudes that had no meaningful place in psychology for cultural difference except as defect, oddity, or regression. It follows that cultural and ethnic diversity should be both in the center of the curriculum and throughout it, not isolated in some few elective, or even required, courses on "individual differences."

As Clifford Swensen (personal communication, July 24, 1990) pointed out, religion is the most fundamental factor in many people's lives, yet it typically is ignored in discussions of diversity. He said, "The most vital movements in the third world today are fundamentalist Islam in Northern Africa, the Middle East, and part of Southeast Asia, and a fundamentalist Pentecostal Christianity in South and Central America." In the United

States, the most rapidly growing churches are the various sects, particularly Pentecostal sects, and evangelical Christianity. Psychology seldom takes these movements into account in discussions of promoting and understanding diversity, yet they form the basis by which many people interpret and cope with their world.

Moghaddam (1987) discussed the ways in which psychology has developed in a manner consistent with the cultural circumstances in the first world (United States), the second world (e.g., United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Europe), and the third world (developing countries). For example, compared with the United States, European social psychology has placed greater emphasis on cooperation and conflict, conformity, the social psychology of the psychology experiment, philosophy of science, racial and ethnic issues, and, most important, intergroup relationships. Canada has paid more attention to language variations and multiculturalism. Third-world psychology has been directed toward solving social problems. One novel element has been a multidimensional, rather than a unidimensional, conception of individualism-collectivism. In the third world, individualism and collectivism are not seen as mutually exclusive; in the first and second worlds, they are perceived as opposites (Moghaddam, 1987, pp. 917-918).

Training Context and the Professional School Movement

The same sort of contextual analysis that has been applied to traditional university professional psychology programs must also be applied to the professional school movement. The expansion of clinical psychology in traditional programs in the 1960s was fueled by Great Society grant money. As student support declined with government money, the growing availability of third-party reimbursement made the professional psychology movement possible. The somewhat older students, the increasing number of women in the field, and the massive debt for many finishing students must impact on the nature of practice and therefore on the discipline. Tuition-driven institutions with less than ideal faculty pay scales have both necessitated professional practice for many faculty and ensured that the actualities of such practice will enliven teaching. At the same time, the economics of professional school education, coupled with those of the post-Reagan era, make low-paying, socially important work choices less likely.

It is necessary to consider the social, intellectual, and political problem of specifying who the professional psychology core curriculum is actually for in the current training context. My proposal is straightforward. If statements about the core, including the National Council of Schools of Professional Psychology (NCSPP) San Antonio conference resolutions (see McHolland, chap. 21), do indeed specify the "central, innermost, and most essential parts of the professional psychology curriculum," (cf. dictionary definition of *core*; Urdang & Flexner, 1969, p. 298), it makes little sense to say that some programs, even research-oriented ones, should not have them. How could NCSPP or another comparable group say that they have identified the central, innermost, most essential, crucial, critical parts of professional psychology, but, you folks over there, you may want to do something else. If the core is the core, then it is the core. The arguments in this chapter and the San Antonio conference resolutions are for all of professional psychology.

In an ironic fashion, this position is consistent with Matarazzo's (1987) work based on an examination of the chapter headings of introductory psychology texts since the turn of the century. He convincingly argued that the boundaries of the discipline of psy-

chology—as distinct from, for example, history or economics—have been relatively stable. Certainly, many psychologists, including myself, identify with this breadth. Still, to put forward this ecumenical construction of the one psychology is like saying that there is only one United States: much as it was at the turn of the century. Not only have times changed, but there are enormous differences among Boston; Las Vegas; Marquette, Michigan; Terre Haute, Indiana; and De Ridder, Louisiana. Furthermore, it makes a difference whether one moved there after living in five other places or has never lived anywhere else.

To support Matarazzo's (1987) inclusive construction or mine, except to increase breadth, there may be little pragmatic reason to challenge the course labels on the familiar required list or to propose that psychology's pie be divided into differently named pieces. There is sufficient flexibility that programs can usually find a way to do what they want within reasonable boundaries. What fits in these categories is ultimately arbitrated by the selection of compatible site visitors and their judgments (Fox & Barclay, 1989). The content depends on the particular course selected from within each category, on the influence of the program model, on the inherent epistemology, on the syllabus and selection of readings, and on the faculty person's orientation. The process of the teaching and the pedagogy, as well as the faculty person's teaching skill, remains central to what the students actually receive. Although the blurring of differences may be politically desirable and the course titles may be the same, Matarazzo (1987) was wrong, I think, in believing that "the same principles, processes, and core content of the discipline" are taught regardless of the specific area of application, even in "university department[s] of psychology" (p. 893).

Two further aspects of the construction of the core curriculum surround what have been called *models* and *specialties*. Models, of course, refers to those hyphenated, rhetorical phrases scientist-practitioner, scholar-practitioner, and practitioner-scholar that are written in our catalogs and understood to be essential in the accreditation process. Although there is debate about the nature of psychological science, no one from either traditional university programs or professional schools is saying that doctorate-level practitioner training should not have a scientific and scholarly aspect. We should leave behind the current confusing and divisive rhetorical practice and instead use these labels to identify the career paths, with associated priorities, for which each program prepares its students. A main-line academic PhD program preparing university researchers might call itself a scientist-scholar-practitioner program. A professional school, no less scientific, might call itself a practitioner-scholar-scientist program. Two ideas follow: First, everyone would have the same core, whereas the culture, values, and electives of a particular school would be consistent with labels. Second, APA and our students could hold us empirically accountable for our label. A program that put forward scientist training first would need to demonstrate that the majority of its students had a research career path, or changes would be necessary.

The specialty problem is less clear. The great majority of professional programs are clinical. Should the resolutions that come from this and other related conferences apply to industrial-organizational, counseling, school, health, and neuropsychology programs and so forth? In this context, for example, it becomes unclear as to how much time a core-intervention course would focus on psychotherapy. A core-assessment course with industrial-organizational or neuropsychology students would no doubt leave out personality and projective tests. There are at least three alternatives. First, each specialty could interpret the areas within its own context, giving the core a much less specific meaning than the chapters in this volume suggest. Second, these sorts of resolutions

could be limited to clinical psychology, with the attendant risks of the further Balkanization of the profession. Third, more like medicine, clinical psychology could be seen as the generic basis for these specialties (e.g., clinical neuropsychology, clinical health psychology). I tilt in this direction, but I become quickly and uncomfortably aware of how central my identity as a psychotherapist is in my vision of training.

Sometimes, though, these issues seem relatively trivial and mask the larger picture. If psychology is indeed the impressive product of social forces rather than the objective and disinterested development of positivist science, then social forces—people in relationships—can free it to change and to develop a new direction.

Social Reflexivity

A fundamental characteristic of human psychological activity is *reflexivity*. Gergen (1982) paraphrased Alfred Schutz and asserted that one can step out of the ongoing flux of living and by a reflective glance examine actions and behaviors in the past tense (p. 18). This process allows a reflexive review and reconceptualization that in turn impacts on ongoing processes, which are themselves subject to further such reviews. Not only is psychology the product of scientific and professional activity, but scientific and professional activity itself is the subject matter for further scientific and professional activity that is also within the domain of psychology (e.g., the current chapter) (Smedslund, 1985). The situation is different in other professions. The study of the practice of psychology is the psychology of psychology; the study of the practice of law, for example, is the psychology of law. It is possible to delineate a number of aspects of reflexivity: personal reflexivity, personal-professional reflexivity, professional reflexivity, and cultural reflexivity.

Personal Reflexivity

Personal reflexivity is the process by which I examine my past experience with the possibility of changing my future behavior based on what I have learned. This sort of function is central to many of the activities and experiences of professional psychologists. Only dangerously narrow training on the one hand ignores this element of experience for the person of the psychologist and the person of the client or, on the other hand, says this is all one needs to know.

Personal-Professional Reflexivity

Personal-professional reflexivity is the process by which I systematically examine my personal experiences of professional practice and training with the goal of enhanced professional functioning. Common examples include the usual sorts of professional supervision, the discussion of countertransference as well as the rationale for psychotherapy for therapists in the psychodynamic tradition, and the behind-the-mirror consultation techniques of the systemic therapists. Most of us, I suspect, would describe these sorts of personal-professional reflexive experiences as being the core of our identity as psychologists.

Personal-professional reflexivity, as embodied in a systematic set of experiences,

should be central to professional psychology training. In the context of a group of colleagues, students of professional psychology should bring together attitudes, knowledge, personal background and history—both intellect and affect—as well as their own reactions to practice and training experiences in what might be called the integrative or professional socialization core (for a detailed rationale, see Singer, Peterson, & Magidson, chap. 18). It may well be that such training events come to be the sentient core—that is, the set of experiences that feel most central to a program.

Currently, this aspect of training can be seen as coming about in three ways: (a) formally in the sorts of professional development or integrative seminars that some programs have; (b) informally in the various ways learning occurs by being around psychologists, fellow students, and clients in academic and clinical settings; and (c) formally through experiences such as personal therapy, certain aspects of supervision, and interpersonal groups that explicitly focus on the person of the potential psychologist. Statements about the core curriculum should specify the events in which reflexive professional socialization should occur and the boundaries of such required experiences (e.g., required therapy or not).

Similarly, there seems to be general agreement about the critical developmental elements of modeling, individualized feedback and sharing, and reflexive focus inherent in mentoring relationships as core experiences. Yet whether mentoring happens or not seems to be thought of more as a matter of individual diligence or luck rather than as something that results from systematic curricular planning.

Psychologists' views of their own core training experiences could be studied qualitatively. For example, at a recent professional development dinner for our program's faculty, we asked the faculty about the teachable, learnable experiences that made them feel like psychologists. The majority of people cited early experiences as a psychotherapist or mentoring relationships with particular people. No one mentioned course work. If we studied what experienced psychologists actually remembered from their core training and attributed to it, I suspect there would be visions of the field, perhaps a theoretical orientation, some few facts, habits of mind from mentors, active discussions and the beginnings of collegiality, and some negative human examples. The core that arises from these kinds of questions is very different from the one that focuses on what it takes to begin competent practice or to transmit the discipline.

Professional Reflexivity

Professional reflexivity is the way the profession studies itself to learn from its own performance using a full range of methods. Typical examples are historical examinations, such as those of Gergen (1982, 1985) or of Sarason (1981, 1982); more systematic versions of qualitative investigations, such as the one previously described; the ubiquitous APA accreditation self-study; and surveys of training practices.

A survey core, obtained when programs are polled (cf. Morrison, O'Connor, & Williams, chap. 6), reflect the state of the art. Inherently conservative, surveys delineate the degree to which programs have reflexively aspired to meet APA accreditation standards and the degree to which state-licensure statutes overlap. They measure what is, not necessarily what should be.

A variety of operational cores could be defined by asking particular questions (cf. R. J. Bent, personal communication, August 10, 1988): What would be required if we had only 1 year; or if we had to eliminate a year of training, what would go? Alternatively, we

could ask finishing students to identify the six courses that were central to their development as psychologists. It could be that the answers would end up being the rediscovery of the masters degree, paraprofessional training, or social work. Indeed, it may be that the uniqueness of professional psychology training at the doctoral level is the combination of core and elective elements within a discipline.

From the perspective of reflexivity, it is clear that the training of professional psychologists should be centrally influenced by the context and demands of the professional practice situation. Although certainly psychological science does come to be applied in practice, it is equally as true that the practice—the real needs of psychologists and clients in the world outside universities—appropriately demands a particular kind of relevant and useful scientific psychology. Arguably, responsiveness to the explicit demands of professional practice is one of the cornerstones on which professional psychology and the professional school movement is based. It is only relatively recently in organized psychology that NCSPP explicitly put forward that the actual nature of practice should determine the professional core competency areas: relationship (interpersonal), assessment, intervention, research and evaluation, consultation and education, and management and supervision (including ethics) (this volume throughout; Bent & Cannon, 1987; Bourg et al., 1989). Training is to include relevant knowledge, skills, and attitudes.

Research and evaluation is both a professional competency and one way in which psychological knowledge products are developed. Consistent with the vision of Trierweiler and Stricker (see chap. 14), professionals should be seen as local clinical scientists both with an expanded array of psychological research methods and with an expanded vision of the relevance of this research to practice.

Yet another likely result of the individual focus of American psychology is that consultation and education as well as management and supervision seem superficially less central and less easy to specify and have less written about them. Certainly these processes are not inherently simpler, and professional psychologists spend substantial amounts of time in these activities. As academic administrators know, good therapists are easier to find than good teachers. A particular effort is needed to bring these areas into central focus in professional psychology education so they do not seem like add-ons.

The core as it has been discussed so far has been a product of the past and the present rather than the reflexive acknowledgment of changing professional roles and the health-care marketplace. A core for the psychologist of the future might, for example, emphasize NCSPP categories of management and supervision and consultation and education and deemphasize long-term psychotherapy and time-consuming assessment techniques.

The context of the development and implementation of a core curriculum should also be a matter of explicit scrutiny and analysis, specifically (a) the importance of national meetings on curriculum, including structure, process, organizational sponsorship, and attendance; and (b) the elements of the administration of the accreditation and licensure process. For example, the ways in which programs meet requirements are influenced by the fact that it is much easier for one to demonstrate to a licensing board or site-visit team that a course meets a particular requirement than it is to show how it was met by, say, portions of three courses and part of a practicum.

Cultural Reflexivity

On the cultural level, not only does the society influence the psychology in this reflexive manner, but psychology influences society (Gergen, 1982, pp. 18-26). Aspects of psychoanalysis and behaviorism have seeped into the culture and now influence the very phenomena that are being examined in a way that astrophysics cannot possibly influence planetary motion. Whereas some of this is unintentional, much is the intentional, ultimately positive result of the activities of professional psychologists. Primarily, this is done by impacting on the symbolic and conceptual systems, for example, bringing ideas such as repression, midlife crisis, and mental illness into our collective experience. However, it can be argued that dominant theoretical systems inadvertently can support particular potentially negative ways of making sense of experience. Perhaps behaviorism has given rise to ideas that suggest that successful functioning in relationships requires that one gain stimulus control over others' actions (Gergen, 1982, p. 32). Similarly, psychoanalysis may have encouraged a view that personal change is extremely difficult, that it takes many years to accomplish, and that an apparently passive stance is an initial prerequisite. Furthermore, developmentalists who uncritically describe the status quo position on aging inevitably support a discrediting, demeaning, and inadequate national policy (cf. Gergen, 1982, p. 170). Like a self-fulfilling prophesy, ideas such as all of these ultimately impact on public policy, education, and the core curriculum.

Social Interactional Perspective

The social interactional view argues for the primary (rather than secondary) importance of attention to dyadic and group interactions (Carson, 1983; Kiesler, 1982; Leary & Maddux, 1987). A detailed consideration of this view is outside the scope of this chapter and is discussed, in part, by Polite and Bourg (see chap. 11). Certainly, an interactional perspective on marriage and psychotherapy is increasingly included in professional psychology training. Still, the fact that NCSPP felt that it must explicitly speak of requiring the "systems view" (Bourg et al., 1989, p. 70) suggests that some programs may yet ignore or minimize the interactional perspective and that the position is gaining in importance in psychology's future.

A particular element of the social interactional view relevant to the core curriculum is pedagogy. Enormous variations in teaching quality and pedagogy among courses both between and within schools are mostly ignored in the documents produced at national conferences. Although being for good teaching is synonymous with being for apple pie, the contingencies in universities that deemphasize such classic cooking and give a secondary status to teaching continue to be influential. There should be explicit attention to the interactional elements of pedagogy in discussions of the core curriculum in a number of ways:

1. Goals and content can be vastly different even within courses of the same name.
2. The place of a course in the curriculum can change its meaning (e.g., history and systems in the first year is introductory; in the last year it can be integrative).
3. A pedagogy that emphasizes the development of critical thinking is substantially different from one that emphasizes the pouring of information from the large beaker into small ones.
4. Integration of basic science and professional training is critical. If basic science

and professional training are to be integrated in practice, they must be integrated in courses where faculty must themselves have that capability.

5. The pedagogical purpose of dissertations and other research efforts for those not aspiring to a research career should be specified (see Trierweiler & Stricker, chap. 14).
6. Course formats (lecture, seminar, field placement, special projects) influence outcome (cf. Morrison, O'Connor, & Williams, chap. 6).
7. Excellence in teaching should be a central concern of professional psychology training institutions.

Social Individual Influences

The vast number of social influences on the individual are beyond the scope of this chapter. Leary and Maddux (1987, p. 907) include two aspects when they speak of "social/dysgenic psychology" (the study of interpersonal processes in the development of dysfunctional behavior) and "social-diagnostic psychology" (the study of the interpersonal processes involved in the identification, classification, and assessment of psychological problems). Simple transpositions of the psychology of the individual have tended to confuse rather than to illuminate (cf. Sarason, 1982, p. 211). The conception of multiple levels of understanding has all too often led to justifications for staying at the individual level. It is not simply that there is a social level to understanding the individual. It is that the individual and the social exist simultaneously in an integrated manner in the lives of people.

Social Responsibility

Sarason (1986) argued that a scientific field needs a center, a sense of focus that explains, directs, organizes, and gives purpose to a field.

In its own way it establishes a sense of community, a means whereby individual and collective effort will be governed and judged. The center not only alters the boundaries of what is known, it also points to what remains unknown. . . . The center has an implied moral quality in that it derives from a history of the field strewn with examples of immodesty in past centers that inadequately respected the significances of the unknown. (p. 900)

Gergen (1982) made a parallel point: The "valuational goals" of the scientists shape what is "found" (p. 28). Phenomena such as sexual abuse (Berson, 1989) and posttraumatic stress disorder are not "out there" (Gergen, 1982, p. 28) waiting to be discovered like some distant planet, but instead reflect the "tastes, values, needs, or motives" (Gergen, 1982, p. 28) of particular scientists.

Perhaps an aspirational core should embody the best elements of what could be created within our professional training institutions. Courses that focus on the planning, development, and public policy elements of future mental health systems might be desirable. Students might be required to donate a day per week in 1 year to work on a particularly difficult problem in professional psychology in their own communities. The values underlying the professional psychology core must reflect its highest aspirations, not just minimum standards.

To articulate our center and to give meaning to a vision of public interest, a social

responsibility core should specify the principles to be embodied in all the curriculum. Consistent with the aspirations of both the NCSPP conferences in 1989 in San Juan and in 1990 in San Antonio, the social context of cultural and ethnic diversity, age, gender, and sexual preference should be an integral part of our science, practice, and curriculum. To the extent that we may be dealing with prejudice within the ranks of our own faculty and students, this aspect of the core may require a level of intervention different from that traditionally considered in curriculum changes.

Embedded in the values and attitudes underlying core curriculum, we need to bring an expanded moral and social vision to the center of professional psychology and to traditional academic psychology as well. Not only is it the right thing to do—it is the best science and the best practice.

ACADEMIC – SCIENTIFIC CORE CURRICULUM

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Before the advent of applied psychology and the meteoric rise of clinical psychology following World War II, the academic – scientific curriculum was essentially the entire curriculum in psychology. The prevailing university-based psychology programs defined their own curricula with substantial variation from program to program. After the rise of applied psychology, with the need for particular applied training and other attendant issues (e.g., timing of the internship and, in some states, the movement to license psychologists), the notion of a core or germ of scientific psychology came to have an accepted meaning within the discipline, although often grudgingly (see Jones, 1987, for a partial review of this period of development). The academic – scientific core of psychology came to be seen as analogous to the mathematics and physics training in the engineering disciplines. The core was the sine qua non of psychology: that which applied psychology actually applied.

The debate as to whether there is or should be a prescribed academic – scientific core curriculum continues today in both nonapplied and applied psychology. At recent meetings of the Council of Graduate Departments of Psychology (COGDOP), for example, the discussion of the possibility of implementing common core requirements across all graduate programs in psychology provoked heated debate. Nonapplied programs are much more variable in their basic curricula than are programs subject to accreditation review from the American Psychological Association (APA) or other bodies. Considerable disagreements erupted about what the academic – scientific core of psychology does or should contain and about the associated issue of institutional autonomy. In this context, it is significant that the phrase *academic – scientific core* does not appear

in the San Antonio conference resolutions, although the much less controversial phrase *knowledge base* does (see McHolland, chap. 21).

Both applied and nonapplied programs have railed against core content being delineated by accrediting bodies. Nonetheless, programs that train professionals for service delivery, particularly within the health sector and where eventual state licensing is an issue, generally accept the necessity for some consensually defined core curriculum.

Operational Academic-Scientific Core

The operational delineation of the academic-scientific core-content areas for professional training is specified in APA accreditation materials (APA, 1979) and embodied in the accumulated judgments of the Committee on Accreditation. Both now and in the past, the accreditation guidelines were created through and gain their credibility from the APA political process and the participation of esteemed psychologists in applied graduate education. Implicitly, if not explicitly, as based on their own studies of psychology, these participating psychologists determined those content areas that could be seen as core.

This operationally defined academic-scientific core includes study in biological bases of behavior, cognitive-affective bases (learning), individual differences, history and systems, social bases of behavior, and research methods and statistics (APA, 1979). Recent discussions of the scope of the accreditation process resulted in suggestions that training in ethics and professional standards, normal development, and psychological measurement be specified more directly in the academic-scientific core.

It is interesting to note that this academic-scientific core represents a mid-20th-century estimation rather than a historical appreciation of the roots of psychology. Philosophy, for example, is notably absent from this core except as covered within individual courses in the content areas. Physics, a historic contributor to psychology, also is noticeable by its absence except perhaps for the frayed remnants that remain in some areas of the biological and the learning areas. Nonetheless, APA puts forward a definition of the accreditation standards as representing an irreducible minimum of content areas beyond which groups of educators in psychology could not go without unresolvable disagreements (APA, 1982).

Academic-Scientific Core in Professional Schools Today

Rationale for the Academic-Scientific Core Curriculum in Professional Psychology

The rationale for the academic-scientific core is inherent in the interpretation of the phrase *applied psychology*. Professional psychologists apply the academic-scientific knowledge and methods of the discipline to real-world problems. The doctorate-level professional psychologist has the requisite understanding to apply nonspecific academic-scientific knowledge aptly to novel situations and to problems where manuals and textbooks are silent. This high-level ability differentiates the doctorate-level psychologist from the technician. Indeed, it has been a common observation that the critical thinking capability, developed within the framework of the academic-scientific core, is

a crucial component of training for practice (Meltzoff, 1986). As long as applied training is seen in this perspective, the academic – scientific core will maintain its importance.

Pedagogy

Professional schools differ from other psychology graduate programs and from each other in the manner in which the academic – scientific core is taught. Differences exist among traditional programs, university-based professional schools, and free-standing schools in the training of the faculty assigned to teach the academic – scientific core. In traditional programs, based in departments that train other groups of students in the scientific specialties, courses are taught by active scientists who represent narrow areas of the specialties. Although this does not guarantee that survey courses, for example, will be taught well, it should ensure that the instructors remain current with the field and have specialized knowledge of some complex concepts or studies to bring to their presentations. University-based professional schools are less likely to have such specialists on their faculties. Most free-standing schools do not have such specialists on their faculties on a full-time basis, but may have them on their adjunct staff.

Regardless of faculty training and background, most professional schools appear to rely generally on the lecture method. Less frequently, laboratory courses in physiological processes, perceptual processes, animal behavior, or child development are offered. Professional psychologists, rather than active scientists in the field of study, often provide the instruction. The implications of this type of instruction for adequacy of learning have never been considered fully.

The traditional department model of active scientist-as-teacher incorporates the student-as-apprentice in the laboratory. At its best, it is characterized by excellent one-on-one training, but it is very inefficient in terms of the numbers of students who can be trained adequately within the model. In professional schools, the training model differs from the traditional department model. Students in academic – scientific core courses are trained didactically, often without hands-on experience. Knowledge and attitudes, rather than laboratory and research skills, are seen as the desirable end product of training. This type of instruction has been characteristic of professional schools for some time and is part of the identity of professional school training (Kopplin, 1986).

In training for applied practice, professional schools assume that graduates usually will not become researchers in one of the traditional scientific areas of psychology. A typical professional school goal was to train students only at the basic level of research skills and to focus more explicitly on fostering the attitude of respect for the scientific basis of the discipline and the understanding that allows them to be knowledgeable consumers of scientific information. Recently, Trierweiler and Stricker (see chap. 14) developed a much more sophisticated view of the professional psychologist as local clinical scientist. In their view, the overarching goal of much of academic – scientific core training is to develop:

critical investigators of local (as opposed to universal) realities (a) who are knowledgeable of research, scholarship, personal experience, and scientific methodology; and (b) who are able to develop plausible, communicable formulations for understanding essentially local phenomena using theory; general world knowledge including scientific research, and, most important, their own abilities as skeptical scientific observers. (p. 104, chap. 14)

Toward this end, students are prepared with a firm foundation on which to build ad-

ditional research skills, but further training is dictated by individual choice rather than program requirement. The training model and philosophy dictate the depth of the content in methodology courses and in the academic-scientific core.

Revision of the Academic-Scientific Core Curriculum

General Considerations

Any revision of the content labeled *core* can be expected to provoke considerable debate. Revisionists have two responsibilities: (a) to consider if each area that is currently included in the academic-scientific core is still crucial, and (b) to consider what, if any, new areas should be added.

In this context, one approach begins by reviewing how the academic-scientific core came into existence. A need for consistency in the training of those licensed for practice was a major driving force behind the creation of the APA accreditation office and, by extension, the construction of the academic-scientific core curriculum. The next step is to think about the extent to which the present academic-scientific core is being driven by the existing accreditation guidelines and by the continuously changing state licensing requirements as determined by the state psychology boards. A further consideration is whether these operational determiners still mirror a rational basis for the knowledge areas that are seen as crucial to applied education and practice.

There are many illustrations of emerging knowledge areas that may be considered for inclusion in the academic-scientific core. Many state boards, for example, are requiring psychologists to become knowledgeable about the myriad ways that acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) affects psychological practice. Should AIDS-related content be included as part of the academic-scientific core? Similarly, a proposal has been put forth to include psychologists within the small group of professionals who may prescribe drugs. Should pharmacology be included in the core? Race, culture, and ethnicity are considered to be crucial in the application of psychological knowledge for therapeutic benefit. Should cultural anthropology or sociology be included as a necessary part of the core? Because religion is so often a key to the understanding of the behavior both of individuals and of groups, should religious studies form part of the core?

In the sections that follow, we propose two models or conceptualizations for revising the academic-scientific core curriculum in a responsible and responsive manner. They may be undertaken either separately or in concert.

Model 1: The Static and Dynamic Elements of the Core

On the one hand, the entity that we call psychology and that we abstract in the academic-scientific core cannot be so changeable that its identity is altered each time a new and important topic is identified. On the other hand, the academic-scientific core cannot be so fixed that it precludes change. Therefore, to ensure both continuity and the capacity for change, the academic-scientific core could comprise explicitly static and dynamic components.

In this model, the static component would not be completely static, but it would have greater inertia than the dynamic component. For example, the static component would consist of the relatively well-accepted areas that constitute the current academic-

scientific core described by the APA accreditation model. The academic-scientific core would be reviewed and evaluated either on an ad hoc basis (e.g., when sufficient dissatisfaction with the existing version reached a crescendo that could not be ignored) or on a structured schedule (e.g., every 5 years). Change would come slowly, only after much deliberation, as befits a construct as important as the core.

The dynamic component would consist of newly identified or developed areas where knowledge is very relevant to practice, such as those previously mentioned (i.e., AIDS, pharmacology, multicultural diversity, and religion). These areas would be included within the relevant content areas of the static component.

The identification of a dynamic component of the academic-scientific core would foster an agreeable attitude toward change. By providing a conceptual mechanism for change, some of the more unpleasant side effects of the current unstructured process for determining change might be eliminated. Specification of the content to be changed would be obtained through a feedback process from psychologists in practice; from state boards of psychology; and from researchers and educators in professional schools, in departments of psychology, and in other disciplines.

The dynamic component of the academic-scientific core could be seen as the precursor to change in the static component. The longer a content area is held within the dynamic portion, the more likely that it should become part of the static portion. As an illustration, issues of multicultural diversity, long included within the social bases of behavior, might become a separate content area in a modification of the static component.

Model 2: Integrating the Academic-Scientific and Professional Cores

A second approach to revision of the academic-scientific core is to integrate it with the professional core. As Peterson suggested, "The practice—the real needs of psychologists and clients in the world outside universities—appropriately demands a particular kind of relevant and useful scientific psychology" (p. 33, chap. 3). The point here is that the psychology of the 1990s is not one where there is simply a basic science and applications of it. There is also a strong and vigorous applied science of psychology. It follows that the essential elements of the academic-scientific core and the professional core could be taught in an integrated manner.

According to an integrative approach, each course in the academic-scientific core should communicate core professional relevance and vice versa. For example, in a clinical training program, the core course in biological bases of behavior should integrate elements of practice that demand understanding in biological terms. These might include eating disorders, sexual dysfunction, gender issues, and assessment of developmental disabilities. An interesting implication of such an integration is that the most qualified person to teach the restructured course may not be the laboratory scientist or the practicing professional psychologist. Rather, some retraining of either one might be necessary to accomplish the task. We would not expect the practicing professional to have engaged actively in experiments that led to current scientific advances, and we would not expect the active scientist to be experienced in the intricacies of applied practice.

As Derner and Stricker (1986) suggested, faculty in professional school roles are more subject to curricular demands and programmatic needs than the faculty in traditional university departments. Integrating the academic-scientific core and the applied core may place an additional demand on the professional school faculty. An alternative might be to develop a team-teaching approach characterized by an active scientist in tan-

dem with an active practitioner. Although the staffing patterns of many professional schools do not lend themselves to this option, nonetheless this alternative offers great flexibility in implementing an integrative curriculum.

Integrating the academic – scientific with the applied core might be accomplished best incrementally, one professor at a time or one content area at a time. Otherwise, the entire curriculum may become so fluid that it will confuse rather than educate.

One major implication of this integration would be a move toward a curricular model that is much more content oriented than course oriented. One of the inherent drawbacks of a curriculum that is designed to satisfy accreditation guidelines and the insistence of licensing boards that a particular topic be addressed in training is that programs equate content with course. Generally, separate courses, whose titles mirror the topics judged to be important, are developed. For example, we now teach a separate course in ethics even though ethical content permeates practicum training and some didactic courses. Most curricula include a specific course in history and systems even though historical content is included in most academic – scientific core courses.

If training programs move toward an integrative model, whether alone or in concert with the static and dynamic components model, then a content-oriented, competency-based curriculum may emerge. If and when this happens, training programs and state boards must communicate better and must cooperate more in the licensing procedure so that graduates are not affected adversely. Already state boards may determine that a student who completed an APA-accredited program must take additional course work to be eligible to sit for licensure. Lack of communication and cooperation between programs and state boards would be detrimental to programs and their graduates.

Preparation for Current and Future Practice

It is our responsibility to prepare our students both for the world that they will encounter soon after graduation and for the world of the future. To accomplish this we must be able to translate our vision of future issues into the dynamism that is built into the curriculum. The issues relating to the static and dynamic portions of the academic – scientific core curriculum have an important relation to this preparation. Programs cannot rely only on the static component of the academic – scientific core to provide the underpinnings for future practice. For example, at present we can predict that the AIDS epidemic will extend into the future. How have training programs responded to this immense problem? On the basis of a brief review of course offerings and discussions with faculty at many of the National Council of Schools of Professional Psychology institutions, only a small number have responded programmatically to this issue. Clear acknowledgment of a changeable, dynamic component of the curriculum could facilitate our response to predicted demands of future practice and might foster a proactive approach toward the identification of such demands.

5

TEACHING THE CORE CURRICULUM

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During the past few years, each of us has had students express some variation of the following: "It is nice to be going to school at a place that gives us the kind of experience that you are teaching us to provide for our patients." On a similar note, a student included in the acknowledgment section of her dissertation—which ironically was concerned with the parallel process between supervision and psychotherapy—an expression of gratitude to her program "for creating an atmosphere which fosters professional and personal growth" (Vickers, 1974, p. iii). It is exactly the nature of this learning atmosphere—in the university, in the classroom, in the supervisory session, and in the clinical session—that we address in this chapter.

Psychotherapy, the area of clinical practice that is the focus of much of professional training, is an educational experience, an attempt to teach the patient new, more comfortable, more productive, and more fulfilling ways of functioning. It must be understood that what is being taught in psychotherapy is not merely cognitive, nor is teaching concerned only with conscious material. If we recognize that psychotherapists teach affective—cognitive units and do so taking into account unconscious influences on learning, it quickly becomes apparent that neither love nor knowledge is sufficient for learning to occur.

How material is taught is as important as what is taught. Frequently, a parallel process occurs in which the student learns both what is being taught *and* the way in which it is being taught. The patient learns to emulate the therapist's calm, self-reflective manner and his or her concern for understanding rather than for judging. The therapist is able to provide these conditions in part because of the supervisor's gentle reassurance, clarity of thought, and accepting manner. The student acquires concepts to use in treatment from a classroom where free inquiry is valued and where creative thought is rewarded. Professors and students alike thrive in an institutional setting that encourages personal

development and supports personal growth. At every stage of the pedagogic sequence, modeling of therapeutic, growth-enhancing behavior occurs and is transmitted in a parallel process to the other stages. The teacher, whether an administrator, a professor, a supervisor, or a therapist, models the desirable behavior. The pupil, whether a faculty member, a student, a supervisee, or a patient, identifies with the teacher, incorporates the affect as well as the content of the learning, and grows as a result of the process.

Pedagogy

Clinical Supervision

Nowhere is this pedagogic sequence as clear as in the process of clinical supervision. Regardless of the orientation, the supervisee sees a patient and then presents the case to a supervisor, who listens carefully, provides support and guidance, and helps the student to help the patient and, concurrently, to develop clinical skills. Supervision is an approach in which both teaching and demonstrating occur simultaneously. Fleming and Benedek (1966) referred to supervision as a learning alliance, and they viewed its effectiveness as maximized in a climate of trust and cooperation relatively free of neurotic conflicts on the part of both members. A similar description could apply to psychotherapy.

Appreciation of the relation between the teaching and the demonstrating functions of supervision is not restricted to any single orientation. Psychoanalysis is attuned to parallel process. Ekstein and Wallerstein (1958) considered supervision to be "analogous to the psychotherapeutic process in which we hope to help our patients" (p. 262). The more humanistic approaches also are concerned with this parallelism. Rogers (1957) discussed the need for a supervisor to model facilitative behaviors to create an atmosphere for learning in supervision, just as is needed in therapy. Conceptually, one orientation may emphasize identification and another modeling, but both require that the teaching process be consistent with the content.

Learning Environment

As the therapist is the model for the patient and the supervisor is the model for the supervisee, the administrator can be a model for the learning community that is being constructed. A community that encourages respect, openness, and mutual valuation is likely to develop faculty members who treat students in this manner, and those students will find it easier to treat patients with the empathic attunement that encourages growth. Conversely, a community that is hostile and competitive will develop a faculty that is mutually distrustful and that uses students as pawns. These students, in turn, will be more involved in using patients to prove their competence than in aiding the patients to grow. Clearly, a professional school whose expressed purpose is the training of clinical practitioners must attend to the construction of an environment that parallels the values that we hold for practice. It is through this modeling that our students can develop their skills in a manner that will ultimately benefit their patients.

Academic Instruction

Lecture format. Core-curriculum academic instructors must recognize that doctoral students view individual lecture and discussion presentations as potential models for future professional commitments, orientations, and values. Although our students intensively pursue such models in all aspects of their education, the classroom may be where the first and most vital connections to professional models occur. At its best, in the instructor – student exchange in the classroom, students can become inspired and be guided to pursue special directions in clinical psychology. For this reason, it is useful to note briefly some prominent communicative features of the lecture and discussion formats that impact student development and identification.

The instructor's unique lecture style provides information to a student that goes far beyond the mere transmission of content. The instructor's enthusiasm and excitement about particular ideas, research, vignettes, theories, and controversies frequently signal a type and depth of interest and involvement that have the capacity to generate parallel interests in the student. Often the instructor's involvement attracts and then provides an initial foundation for student investment both in the course area and in the instructor's approach to it. In observing the affective involvement of the faculty, the student learns what matters to the teacher. The instructor's enthusiasm and passion are often more of a factor in actual student modeling than is usually recognized. Academic and clinical directions chosen by students owe much to this particular dimension of lecturing.

The student also may be drawn to the instructor by the clarity, vividness, and intellectual force evident in the lecture. The capacity to illuminate a particular area of human experience through a dramatic and organized presentation also communicates excitement. The instructor's personal integration of a range of concepts, presentation of a focused line of argumentation, and the clear and balanced display of thoughtful opinion and critical thought excite an identification process in the eager student seeking a viable model for organizing the raw data of clinical psychology.

Within this matrix of instructor enthusiasm and intellectual persuasiveness, the eager student identifies the types of knowledge bases preferred by the instructor—to be able, initially, to follow in the teacher's academic and clinical tracks. One teacher's emphasis on formal research to validate a particular theoretical position models this empirical emphasis to the student, whereas another instructor's focus on the need for clear theoretical and conceptual articulation provides the student with a different priority in approaching certain academic materials. In the lecture presentations, then, students are constantly identifying areas of instructors' affective and intellectual emphases and styles, and they use these experiences to prioritize their own interests and values.

The lecturer's balance between enthusiasm and skepticism is also carefully observed by the student. The lecturer who balances excitement and investigatory rigor models the clinician's oscillation between participation and careful and rigorous observation, a major feature of sound clinical functioning. Students can observe this same dynamic in the intellectual and affective elements of their instructor's presentations and can consider how such a balance might function in their future clinical work.

Furthermore, lecturers can demonstrate a principle of interpersonal relatedness to students. Many master teachers have noted that the effectiveness of lecture presentations of new concepts or ideas depends on the instructor's ability to relate the course material to relevant experiences in students' lives. In clinical psychology, we might call this *teaching empathy*, a process by which instructors model attention to the parallel con-